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DOES THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY MATTER?
AN EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
Jeremy W. Bock *

INTRODUCTION

"We don't know exactly how often the presumption makes a
difference 'to a case outcome."
In patent law, the presumption of validity' exerts a profound
influence on litigation strategy.' It has attracted criticism-not
only from academics' but also from at least one federal judge'* @ 2015 Jeremy W. Bock. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Memphis Cecil
C. Humphreys School of Law. The author thanks Bernard Chao, John Golden, Richard
Gruner, Parisa Jorjani, Mark Lemley, Su Li, Evelyn Mak, Shawn Miller, Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Efthimios Parasidis, Greg Reilly, David Schwartz, Ryan Vacca, Michelle Yang,
his colleagues at Memphis Law, and the participants at the June 2013 Workshop on
Research Design for Causal Inference at Northwestern University School of Law, the Fifth
Annual Legal Scholars Conference at Arizona State University College of Law, PatCon4 at
University of San Diego School of Law, the 2014 SEALS Conference, and the 14th Annual
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Berkeley Law for helpful discussions and
feedback. The author thanks the University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law for supporting this research. The survey experiment reported in this article was
conducted pursuant to a protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Memphis.
1. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 70 (2007).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
3. For example, accused infringers may prioritize noninfringement defenses over
invalidity defenses because of the heightened burden associated with proving invalidity.
See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, PatentInvalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
71, 118 (2013) (observing that "the elevated burden of proof that applies to invalidity,...
which stems from the statutory presumption that a patent is valid unless proved
otherwise, makes it relatively more difficult to win an invalidity defense than a
noninfringement defense even if the two defenses would otherwise have similar merits").
4. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over
Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn't Fit All, How
Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1955 (2009) ("[A] weakening of the
presumption of validity would be particularly good for the 'Davids' of the system who face
off against the 'Goliaths.' It directly protects them from the in terrorem effect of junk
patents ... ."); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 47 ("[T]he law makes [patent]
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for making weak patents difficult to invalidate. When mentioned
to the jury, the presumption is perceived by litigants as exerting
a powerful pro-patentee influence that overshadows its nominal
procedural function of assigning the burden of proving invalidity.6
Despite its apparent strategic importance in patent litigation,
hardly any empirical studies exist on whether and to what extent
the presumption may affect how jurors decide invalidity issues,
thereby leaving many basic questions unanswered and
unexamined in the academic literature. For example, would
mentioning the presumption to the jury actually affect the
likelihood that it will find a patent invalid? If so, to what degree?
Because the presumption assumes a level of administrative
correctness,' should the jury ever be informed of the operational
deficiencies (e.g., application backlog, quality of examiner review)
of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO")?5 If so, would such
information undermine the presumption of validity?
To help answer these questions, this article reports the results
of the first experimental study on the effect of instructing the jury
on the presumption of validity. The impact on case outcomes
when the presumption is mentioned, and whether criticisms
about the PTO might counteract its influence (or vice versa), have
long been the province of speculation. Experimental analysis may
provide additional insights that could help refine intuitions about
issuance mistakes hard to reverse. The culprit is a legal doctrine known as the
presumption of validity.").
5. See William Alsup, Memo to Congress, A District Judge's Proposal for Patent
Reform: Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standardand CalibratingDeference to the
Strength of the Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1648 (2009) ("A central reason

for the litigation boom is the presumption of validity and the 'clear and convincing'
standard. ... This presumption of validity applies equally to all patents-even those that
are almost certainly invalid. This is a huge advantage for the patent holder-and it is
often an unfair advantage. . . .").
6. See, e.g., William G. Childs, The Implementation of FDA Determinations in
Litigation: Why Do We Defer to the PTO but Not to the FDA?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.

155, 172 (2004) ("The psychological impact of this presumption of validity is difficult to
measure. However, it is not insignificant that a jury is instructed by the one nominally
neutral person in the courtroom that it must begin deliberations with the belief that the

patent is valid." (emphasis omitted)).
7. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d
1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The presumption of validity is based on the presumption of
administrative correctness of actions of the agency charged with examination of
patentability." (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed. Cir.

1985))).
8.

See infra notes 65-67.
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whether and when a presumption instruction may have effects on
the case that go beyond the nominal procedural role contemplated
by the Federal Circuit, which views the presumption instruction
as an optional feature so long as the jury is informed of the clear
and convincing standard of proof for invalidity.! In the Federal
Circuit's view, any significance carried by the presumption
instruction is subsumed in the clear and convincing standard."o
This is contrary to the view commonly held among litigants that
jurors are profoundly influenced by the presumption instruction,
separate and apart from the standard of proof." The potential
consequences of this mismatch in perceptions have largely
escaped scholarly attention.
The results of the experiment reported in this article largely
confirm the conventional view of litigants that the presumption
instruction may have a substantial impact on the jury's decision
on invalidity issues. The data reveal statistically significant"
differences in the rate at which mock jurors found invalidity
based on whether they were informed of the presumption. Based
on this finding, the potential exists for forum shopping arising
from the absence of a consensus among trial judges on whether
the presumption instruction should be included.
Part I of this article provides background information on the
presumption of validity that is relevant to the experimental
study. Part II describes the methodological design of a survey
experiment used to test the conventional assumptions regarding
the effect of mentioning the presumption and criticisms about the
PTO during trial. Part III reports the results of the survey
experiment. Based on the data, Part IV analyzes the procedural
considerations and the error costs associated with the presence or
absence of the presumption instruction. Part V discusses the
limitations of this study, and is followed by a brief conclusion.

9. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
10. Id.
11. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
12. In this article, a p-value less than 0.05, which corresponds to significance at the
5% level, will be treated as the threshold for statistical significance. Where appropriate, pvalues less than 0.10 but greater than or equal to 0.05, which correspond to significance at
the 10% level, may also be reported to provide context. What Researchers Mean by ...
Statistical Significance, INST. FOR WORK & HEALTH, https://www.iwh.on.ca/wrmb/statis
tical-significance (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
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I. BACKGROUND

The presumption of validity, which was originally a common
law presumption that is now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282," has
been treated by the courts as providing the normative foundation
for the "clear and convincing" standard of proof for invalidating a
patent. 14 The Federal Circuit views the presumption of validity
and the clear and convincing standard for rebutting it as
"different expressions of the same thing."" Indeed, in most
adjudicatory contexts, separating the effect of the presumption
from the standard of proof is difficult because the former is
analytically subsumed in the latter. For example, if an accused
infringer files a motion for summary judgment on an invalidity
issue, the judge's analysis in deciding the motion will focus on
whether the movant has carried his burden under the clear and
convincing standard. The presumption of validity, to the extent
that it is part of the judge's analysis, is inherent in the evaluation
of whether the movant has satisfied the applicable standard of
proof because the legal effect of the presumption is limited to
placing the burden of proving invalidity on the patent
challenger."
Where the presumption itself (separate and apart from the
clear and convincing standard) is perceived to materially affect
case outcomes is during jury trials. Specifically, the conventional
wisdom among practitioners and judges suggests that including
an instruction on the presumption of validity communicates a
powerful normative message to a lay jury about the need to
respect the decisions of the PTO."

13. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
,_ 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011).
14. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S.
15. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258 ("[T]he presumption of validity and heightened burden of
proving invalidity 'are static and in reality different expressions of the same thing-a
single hurdle to be cleared.'" (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a); New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970
F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The presumption acts as a procedural device which places
the burden of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion of
invalidity at trial on the alleged infringer.").
17. See, e.g., David C. Bohrer, Knocking the Eagle Off the Patent Owner's Shoulder:
Chiron Holds that Jurors Don't Have to Be Told that a Patent Is Presumed Valid, 21

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 259, 282-83 (2004) ("The gospel among patent
trial attorneys is that jurors are extremely reluctant to second-guess the examiner ....

PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
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In a patent trial, the presumption of validity is typically
mentioned in the jury instructions in conjunction with the clear
and convincing standard for proving invalidity."8 Under Federal
Circuit law, the presumption need not be explicitly mentioned to
jurors so long as they are informed that the burden rests on the
accused infringer to prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence." This is because the presumption, which has no
evidentiary value,2 is simply a procedural device that assigns the
burden of proof " and is considered to be part of the same hurdle
imposed by the clear and convincing standard.2 2 It may appear
then, that mentioning the presumption is essentially redundant if
the jury instructions already recite the clear and convincing
standard. However, the perceived value to the patentee of
instructing the jury on the presumption appears to lie in creating
an atmosphere in the courtroom that discourages jurors from
second-guessing the PTO." That is, the "expressive function" of
the presumption of validity24 may take a more salient role during
trial, when the jury is present, than during the pretrial stage. As
Mark Janis has observed, the presumption itself carries an

Why should jurors feel they cannot second-guess the examiner? The answer is clear: this
is what they are told to feel by the instruction on the presumption and related arguments
by counsel." (emphasis omitted)).
18.

See,

e.g.,

AM.

INTELL.

PROP.

LAW

ASS'N, AIPLA's

MODEL

PATENT

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS 9 (2012), available at http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/oth
er-pubs/Documents/2012%20final%20model%20jury%20instructions.docx.
19. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258-59 (internal citations omitted).

20. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("The presumption of validity afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not have independent
evidentiary value. Rather the presumption places the burden of going forward, as well as
the burden of persuasion, upon the party asserting invalidity." (citing Solder Removal Co.
v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (CCPA 1978))).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ("The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The presumption, like all legal presumptions,
is a procedural device, not substantive law. It does require the decisionmaker to employ a
decisional approach that starts with acceptance of the patent claims as valid and that
looks to the challenger for proof of the contrary.").
22. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258-59.
23. See, e.g., Bohrer,supra note 17, at 282-83.
24. See generally Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious
Preponderance," 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 927 (2004) ("[A]cknowledgment of the
presumption's expressive function reminds us that the fact that we have a presumption of
patent validity is as significant as the precise verbal formulation that we use for the
standard of evidence for overcoming the presumption."). For a general discussion of the
law's expressive function, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Functionof Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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overlying message that has significance independent of the
standard of proof. 25
To patentees and accused infringers alike, an explicit
statement in the jury instructions that a patent is presumed valid
is not simply a "different expression" 26 of the applicable standard
of proof. Rather, they view it as a powerful mechanism for
injecting pro-patentee bias, particularly because it is being
delivered by the judge, who is the sole neutral authority-figure in
the courtroom.27
While jurors are commonly perceived to be highly deferential to
the PTO, 28 it is unclear to what extent that deference may be
attributable to jurors feeling strongly discouraged from secondguessing the PTO upon being instructed on the presumption. In
addition, it is possible that lay individuals might be confusing the
presumption with evidence. Such concerns have been recognized
by some judges and practitioners, who have prepared alternative
model patent jury instructions that do not mention the
presumption." Nevertheless, expressly informing the jury of the
presumption of validity is common practice: the model jury
instructions of at least one influential circuit," as well as the
instructions prepared by certain national intellectual property
bar organizations such as the American Intellectual Property

25. Janis, supra note 24, at 930 ("[Tihere is no strict, inevitable correlation between
the words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by the
presumption of validity. The message is independently significant for purposes of patent
policy . . .").

26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. Childs, supra note 6, at 172.
28.

See Kimberly A. Moore, Juries,Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency,39 HOUS.

L. REV. 779, 787 (2002) ("[Plractitioners and scholars alike have frequently opined that
juries are not likely to invalidate patents because juries favor inventors and are unlikely
to second-guess the Patent Office that has technically trained examiners who already
issued the patents.").
29.

See NAT'L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 33

(2009), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatent
JuryInstructions.pdf ("[Ilnstructing the jury on the presumption in addition to informing
it of the highly probable burden of proof may cause jury confusion as to its role in deciding
invalidity.").
30.

See, e.g., MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA (2014), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions;
JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 29, at 33.
31.

NAT'L

See FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 228 (2009),

availableat https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern Jury-Instr/7th_civinstruc 2009.pdf.
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Law Association ("AIPLA")3 2 and the Federal Circuit Bar
Association ("FCBA")"-which reflect the prevailing "best
practices" among practitioners-mention both the presumption
and the clear and convincing standard.
To level the playing field against the patentee in front of the
jury, some accused infringers file motions in limine to exclude
any mention of the presumption,34 while others attempt (with
little success) to introduce evidence during trial on the
operational realities of the PTO (e.g., patent quality issues, the
application backlog, funding issues)." Patentees, for their part,
file motions in limine to bar accused infringers from mentioning
anything to the jury that may disparage the PTO." Although trial
judges usually exclude evidence or arguments critical of the PTO
on the ground that such information would be highly prejudicial
and would undermine the presumption of validity," some judges
have reserved the right to allow such information if the patentee
tries to argue to the jury that deference to the PTO is owed at a
32.
33.

AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, supra note 18, at 9.
FED. CIRCUIT BAR AsS'N, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 36, 48 (2012),

available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9004/Library/2012%20
Updated%20FCBA%2OModel%20Patent%2OJury%20Instructions.pdf.
34. See, e.g., ATC's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion in
Limine No. 1 to Preclude References to the Presumption of Validity of the '356 Patent at 3,
Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., No. 3:08-cv-00335-IEG-NLS
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009), ECF No. 209-1; see also Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97321, at *7 (W.D. Okla. May 10, 2006) (granting defendant's
motion to preclude plaintiff from referring to the presumption of validity).
35. See, e.g., Neutrino Dev. Corp. v. Sonosite, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 529, 544 (S.D. Tex.
2006) ("The Court finds that, to the extent that [the defendant's expert] testimony simply
addresses the potential pressures and potential for error at the PTO, such testimony is
inadmissible."); TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Owl Pharms., L.L.C., No. 1:99 CV 2715, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27657, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2003) ("Testimony by [the defendant's
expert] about the relative shortage of patent examiners at the PTO is inadmissible. The
only purpose such testimony would serve would be to undermine the presumption of
validity of the patents-in-suit." (internal citation omitted)).
36. See, e.g., Cook's Motion in Limine No. 5: To Preclude Endologix from Offering
Argument or Evidence About the Competence of the Examination Process in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, or from Otherwise Denigrating the Office, Its Examiners, or
the Examination Process at 2, Cook Inc. v. Endologix, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1248-TWP-DKL
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2012), ECF No. 255.
37. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 252, 255
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) ("I find such testimony [concerning problems at the PTO] to be
inadmissible. It appears that the purpose of this testimony would be to attempt to

undermine the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 by inviting the jury to
speculate about possible defects, errors, or omissions in the application process . . .");
Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., No. C 92-20643
RMW, 1995 WL 261407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1995).
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level beyond that required by the law." The Federal Circuit
generally views arguments criticizing the PTO to be improper in
front of a jury, and will order a new trial if warranted by the
totality of the circumstances. 39
Whether and under what circumstances the presumption of
validity (or, in some cases, criticisms of the PTO) should be
mentioned to the jury is a question for which empirical analysis
may be useful in helping to test the conventional assumptions
that drive trial strategy. Despite this need, there appears to be
only one prior empirical study that has attempted to collect data
on the presumption of validity separately from the clear and
convincing standard. 40 However, that study did not focus on jury
trials, but rather on Federal Circuit decisions.' In addition, it
used a sample size that was too small to allow any potential
impact of the presumption to be reliably assessed separately from
that of the evidentiary standard of proof.42
Although the impact of a presumption instruction has not been
specifically analyzed in previous empirical research relating to
jury trials, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard has
been the subject of a recent experiment with mock jurors. In
2013, David Schwartz and Christopher Seaman published a
38.

See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 256 ("I caution plaintiff that if it

opens the door by suggesting that some extraordinary deference is due in this case, the
court may revisit this ruling [barring argument concerning the PTO's problems]."
(internal quotations and citation omitted)); Applied Materials, 1995 WL 261407, at *3
("The court will reconsider this ruling [barring mention of the PTO's operational realities],
however, if Applied opens the door by presenting evidence suggesting that some
extraordinary deference is due in this case.").
39. See, e.g., Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) ("[O]n balance, we conclude that a new trial is not warranted in the
circumstances that here prevailed, for the issue] of examiner competence . .. [was] not
raised by post-trial motion; this inaction . .. suggests that in the overall context of the
two-week trial, these aspects were less inflammatory than [the patentee] now
maintains.").
40. See Etan S. Chatlynne, UPDATE: Investigating Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 7, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/11/update-investi
gating-patent-laws-presumption-of-validity.html [hereinafter "Chatlynne Update"] (This
blog post is an update of the results reported in Etan S. Chatlynne, Investigating Patent
Law's Presumption of Validity-An Empirical Analysis, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 37
(2010), available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2010/03/chatlynne.presumptionofvali
dity.final.pdf).
41. See Chatlynne Update, supra note 40.
42. In a dataset compiling 119 invalidity challenges, Chatlynne reported that the
Federal Circuit expressly applied the presumption of validity or the evidentiary standard
in its analysis a total of twenty-six times. Id.
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study in which they used a survey experiment to investigate the
effect of modifying the standard of proof on a juror's decision to
find a patent invalid.43 They presented mock jurors with a patent
case hypothetical where the ultimate issue to be decided was
obviousness.4 4 The mock jurors were then randomly assigned to
one of three jury instructions that contained different versions of
the standard of proof: (1) clear and convincing evidence; (2) clear
and convincing evidence with an additional instruction based on
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership45 pertaining to new
evidence not considered by the PTO; and (3) preponderance of the
evidence. 46 The results of the experiment by Schwartz and
Seaman suggest that jurors' decisions to find invalidity may be
affected substantially by the standard of proof.47
Given that jury instructions on the clear and convincing
standard have been the subject of experimental analysis, a logical
next step would be to explore the effect of instructing the jury on
the presumption of validity.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN

The conventional assumptions pertaining to the inclusion of an
instruction on the presumption of validity in the jury instructions
raise a variety of normative questions, some of which may be
amenable to experimental study. This article seeks to explore two
such questions. First, would mentioning the presumption to the
jury actually affect the likelihood that a patent will be found
invalid? (If so, what is the magnitude of that impact, given that
juries are perceived to be generally deferential to the PTO and
view inventors positively?) 48 Second, if the accused infringer were
to introduce information critical of the PTO during trial, what, if
any, impact could this have on the presumption of validity?

43.

David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil

Litigation:An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 431-32 (2013).
44. Id. at 451.
_, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
45. 564 U.S. -,

46. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 432.
47. Id. at 459-61.
48. Moore, supra note 28, at 787.

[Vol. 49:417
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To explore these issues, an online survey experiment" was
conducted in which mock jurors were presented with a
hypothetical patent case and were asked whether the asserted
patent was invalid for obviousness. To mitigate potential
response bias and "demand effects,"o a "between-subjects"
design"' was used for the survey: Each respondent was allowed to
take the survey only once, and there were no questions that
asked about the same issue both before and after the
hypothetical. The general flow of the survey experiment is shown
below:
Figure 1: Flow Diagram of Survey Experiment
Hypo Version 11
No Treatments

Consent

Questions re:
Citizenship
Age

Form

Residence

Gender
Race,

Hypo Version 2:
Presumption Only
Obviousness _>
Questions

Hypo Version 3:
PTO Criticisms OnlyV

Validation
and
Background

Questions

ypo Version 4: .
Both Treatments

As shown in Figure 1, the survey experiment begins with the
consent form and elicits basic demographic information about the
respondent who will serve as a mock juror.52 The respondent is
49. A survey experiment is different from a regular survey in that it involves a
"treatment" component, which is an element of the survey that is systematically varied in
relation to a "control" or a baseline, so as to allow causal inferences to be drawn. See Shari
Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 359,397-98, 421(3d ed. 2011).
50. See Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from
Experimental Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 933 ("[T]he researcher must be careful
to avoid demand effects-avoid suggesting the desired results to the subjects either
explicitly or implicitly.").
51. See Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its
Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 100 n.101 (2013) ("In a between-subjects design (to be
distinguished from a 'within-subjects' design), the manipulation is hidden from the
subjects; its effect is studied by using two or more samples, ideally matched in all relevant
respects, with each sample receiving a different independent variable. . . .").
52. The presentation of a few basic demographic questions at the beginning of the
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then randomly assigned to one of four versions of the
hypothetical." Each version of the hypothetical presents the
identical fact pattern except for the selective presence (or
absence) of either the presumption of validity in the jury
instructions or criticisms about the PTO in the accused
infringer's arguments, or both. Afterwards, the respondent is
asked whether the patent described in the hypothetical is invalid
for obviousness.54 The respondent is then presented with
validation questions that test whether he understood basic facts
about the hypothetical-if the respondent answers the validation
questions incorrectly, his answers would be excluded from the
analysis. Finally, the survey concludes with questions that ask
about the respondent's background, such as patent-related
experience, education, and jury service.
The hypothetical and the associated questions relating to the
obviousness issue were adapted from Schwartz and Seaman's
"standards of proof' experiment." The hypothetical, which
describes a patent dispute over a golf ball design, was presented
in three parts: the overview, the parties' arguments, and the jury
instructions for deciding whether the asserted patent was
invalid" for obviousness. Using Schwartz and Seaman's
hypothetical provided several advantages. First, it was already
field-tested as being reasonably understandable to lay subjects

survey experiment prior to the hypothetical is intended to track the general order of
events in a trial setting, in which prospective jurors are asked various demographic and
background questions during the jury selection process. This ordering has been used in
published studies of experiments with mock jurors. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond,
Michael J. Saks & Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages:
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 304-05
(1998) ("Before viewing a videotape of the trial . . . , each juror filled out a questionnaire
providing the kind of information that jurors might be asked to provide during jury
selection in a case of this type."). For a sample juror questionnaire, see JUROR
QUESTIONNAIRE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 4-17, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/dpen
0023.pdfl$file/dpenOO23.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). In this study, in order to avoid
respondent exhaustion prior to reviewing the hypothetical, only five basic demographic
questions (citizenship, age, residence, gender, race) were asked prior to the hypothetical,
with additional demographic/background questions presented at the end of the survey.
53. See infra Appendix 1 for an annotated version of the hypothetical.
54. See infra Appendix 2.
55. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 451-56, 474-78.
56. In general, invalidity is evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. See 35 U.S.C. §
282(a) (2012). For simplicity, however, the hypothetical did not identify any specific claims
such that the obviousness questions asked whether the patent (as opposed to a claim) was
invalid. See infra Appendix 2.
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without any background in science or engineering.17 Second, the
hypothetical was based on a case that had two jury verdicts that
reached opposite conclusions concerning invalidity, which may
indicate that there is no clear "right" answer." Finally, the
similarities between the hypothetical used in this experiment,
which explores the presumption of validity, with that used in
Schwartz and Seaman's experiment, which explores the clear and
convincing standard," may facilitate comparisons between the
two studies.
For the purposes of this study, Schwartz and Seaman's
hypothetical was modified as follows:
* A single standard of proof (clear and convincing) was
recited in the instructions to the mock jurors for deciding the
invalidity issue, as opposed to the three different standards used
in Schwartz and Seaman's study."o
* Two treatment blocks were added in order to test the
effects of mentioning the presumption of validity and criticisms of
the PTO to the jury.
* In Schwartz and Seaman's study, the hypothetical specified
that a key prior art reference was not considered by the
examiner, which allowed them to test different versions of the
standard of proof.61 In the present study, the hypothetical was
modified to state that the prior art reference had been considered,
in order to better gauge the mock jurors' baseline level of
deference to the PTO, assuming that the PTO had not made any
glaring errors or omissions.
The two treatment blocks used in the hypothetical were: (i) an
explanation of the presumption of validity in the section
providing instructions to the mock jurors for deciding the
invalidity issue; and (ii) a description of common criticisms of the
PTO in the accused infringer's argument section.62 The treatment
blocks are reproduced below:
57.
58.
59.
60.

Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 451.
Id.
See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 432.

61. Id. at 453.
62. If a court were to ever allow information critical of the PTO to be presented, it
would most likely be presented by a patent law expert called by the accused infringer.
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Presumption Treatment Block: 3
Under the law, Acme's patent is presumed to be valid.
In other words, it is presumed to have been properly
granted. When a party attacking the validity of a patent
relies on prior art that was specifically considered by the
patent examiner, that party bears the burden of
overcoming the deference due a qualified government
agency official who is presumed to have performed his or
her job correctly. The presumption of validity that is
accorded a duly-issued patent can be overcome by "clear
and convincing" evidence of obviousness.
PTO Criticisms Treatment Block:64
That the patent examiner might have made a mistake
should not be surprising. As recognized by numerous
academic researchers, poor patent quality is a serious
problem. The PTO is underfunded and has a backlog of
approximately 600,000 patent applications that are
awaiting examination. The patent examiners are
overworked, and are simply not given enough time to
review patent applications thoroughly.6 6 Indeed,
according to one academic study, about half of all patents
that are litigated in court are found to be invalid."
The selective inclusion of the treatment blocks yielded four
versions of the hypothetical to which the mock jurors were
randomly assigned:

63. The presumption of validity treatment block is an amalgam of the relevant
language from the AIPLA and FCBA model jury instructions. See supranotes 32-33.
64. The footnotes to supporting sources were not included in the versions of the
hypothetical presented to the mock jurors.
65. In fiscal year 2013, 616,409 patent applications were awaiting a first action by an
examiner. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 191 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf.
66. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-10 (2003) [hereinafter "FTC Report"],

available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovationproper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
67. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents,26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998).
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(1) No Treatments version: Neither the presumption of
validity nor criticisms of the PTO were included.
(2) PresumptionOnly version: The presumption was included
but PTO criticisms were not.
(3) PTO Criticisms Only version: PTO criticisms were
included, but the presumption was not.
(4) Both Treatments version: Both the presumption and PTO
criticisms were included.
An annotated version of the hypothetical showing the
treatment blocks is provided in Appendix 1. Whereas the
presumption of validity was contained in a treatment block, all
versions of the hypothetical mentioned the clear and convincing
standard of proof, as required under Federal Circuit law.68
The mock jurors were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk
("MTURK"), a website run by Amazon.com, Inc., where
individuals may sign up to perform online "Human Intelligence
Tasks" for pay." MTURK is a popular platform for social science
survey research." The respondent sample was limited to the
demographic profile of jury-eligible adults: United States citizens
who are at least eighteen years old, and who are currently
residing in the United States." The MTURK site readily allows
the respondent pool to be restricted to individuals who are at
least eighteen years of age who reside in the United States
because anyone who signs up to work on MTURK must provide
verification of his or her age and residency.72 Data on other
68. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
69. AMAZON MECH. TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Nov.
26, 2014).

70. Several recent experimental studies in the intellectual property field have used
MTURK. E.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Bums, Jeanne C. Fromer &
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws' Creativity
Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1950 (2014); Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald,
Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain? Empirical Tests of
Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 24 (2013); Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco & Zachary Bums, What's a Name Worth? Experimental
Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1405 (2013);

Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 456.
71. Juror Qualifications,Exemptions and Excuses, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.
gov/FederalCourts/JuryService/JurorQualificaitons.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
72. Each worker who registers on MTURK must provide verification of their residence
in order for MTURK to process tax information. See Amazon Mechanical Turk
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demographic characteristics, including citizenship, were obtained
through self-identification. Although MTURK allows the
respondent pool to be further restricted based on a respondent's
general approval rating on the site, this option was not used in
order to allow a wide cross-section of respondents to participate
in the study. Each respondent was paid $1.00 for successfully
completing the survey experiment, which ran on MTURK for two
days in July 2014.
Initially, 2616 respondents accessed at least the first page of
the survey, of which 2412 jury-eligible respondents progressed
through survey termination. Of these respondents, 667 were
eliminated because of quality issues that would render their
responses unreliable, such as speeding through the survey,"
failing to correctly answer basic factual questions about the
hypothetical, and providing logically inconsistent answers to
certain questions.74 This yielded 1745 respondents for analysis.
The respondent tally for each of the four treatment versions of
the hypothetical is shown below:

ParticipationAgreement, AMAZON MECH. TURK (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.mturk.com/
mturk/conditionsofuse.
73. Because the hypothetical related to a topic (patent law) that may be unfamiliar to
most adults, it was important that the respondents read at a pace that allowed for
comprehension. According to one measure, the average adult reads at the rate of 300
words per minute, while the average college professor reads at the rate of 675 words per
minute. Brett Nelson, Do You Read Fast Enough to Be Successful?, FORBES (June 4, 2012,
9:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brettnelson/2012/06/04/do-you-read-fast-enough-tobe-successful/. Respondents who read each page of the patent case hypothetical faster
than three times the average adult (i.e., 900 words per minute) had their responses
eliminated from the analysis.
74. For example, if a respondent specified in one question that he did not serve on a
jury but specified in another question that he served as a juror in a civil case, his answers
were eliminated from the final analysis.
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Table 1

Respondents
(Mock Jurors)

Treatment
Scenario
No Treatments
Presumption Only
PTO Criticisms Only
Both Treatments

Total

441
430
436
438

1,745

The mean age of the respondents was thirty-four years, while
the median age was thirty. They were 49% female and 78% white.
A majority (59%) had at least a college degree.7 ' Recent
demographic statistics of federal juries are not available for
comparison." However, a few statistics from a study conducted in
2004"7 of people who reported for jury duty in King County,
Washington (which has a population of over two million)," may
be instructive. According to that study, the individuals who
appeared for jury duty in county court (N=1545)7' had a median
age of forty-eight, 69% were college graduates, 54% were female,
and 86% were white.so In contrast, the general county census
indicated that its residents had a median age of forty-six, 43%
were college graduates, 51% were female, and 74% were white."
Notably, this 2004 study revealed that a substantially higher

percentage of individuals who showed up for jury duty had college
degrees compared to the general population (69% versus 43%).82
In addition, the demographics of those who were eventually
sworn in as jurors were similar to those who showed up for jury
duty." When the King County study is compared to the MTURK

75. This tally does not include individuals who attended college without obtaining a
degree.
76. See Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 458 n.183.
77.

JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: How DELIBERATION PROMOTES
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 53 (2010).

CIVIc ENGAGEMENT AND

78. State and County QuickFacts: King County, Washington, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53/53033.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (listing
King County's population estimate as of 2013).
79. GASTIL ET AL., supra note 77, at 65 tbl.4.3.
80. Id. at 61 tbl.4.2.
81.

Id.

82.
83.

Id.
Id.
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respondents, the most salient difference is the median age,
whereby the MTURK respondents are substantially younger as a
group. With an age distribution that is heavily skewed toward
younger respondents, caution is warranted when analyzing the
relationship between case outcomes and the age variable14 as well
as other background variables (e.g., jury service)" that have some
degree of age-dependence.
III. RESULTS

Overall, the results largely confirm the conventional
assumptions held by litigants on the likely effect of informing the
jury about the presumption of validity and criticisms about the
PTO. At a high-level, the data reveal that mock jurors who were
exposed to the presumption instruction were significantly less
likely to find invalidity. Conversely, informing them of various
criticisms of the PTO appeared to have an effect of comparable
magnitude in the opposite direction. A notable but unexpected
result is that when both the presumption and PTO criticisms
were presented, their effects seemingly canceled each other. A
detailed presentation of the data follows.
A. Treatment Scenarios
The rates at which the mock jurors found invalidity based on
obviousness are graphically summarized below for each of the
four treatment scenarios:

84.
85.

See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2: Invalidity Decisions
(Percentages with Standard ErrorBars)
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No Treatments

Presumption
Only

38.5%
N=-436
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N=438

0

PTO Criticisms Both Treatments
Only

As an initial step, each pair of treatment scenarios was
compared using a Chi-square test to determine if the differences
in the invalidity rates were statistically significant." A
comparison of the No Treatments and the Presumption Only
scenarios (both of which do not contain any criticisms about the
PTO) shows a statistically significant drop in invalidity decisions
when the presumption is mentioned (31.7% vs. 24.7%; p=0.020). 7
If criticisms about the PTO were present in both of the scenarios
being compared, a statistically significant drop in invalidity
decisions occurred if the presumption was added, as shown by a
comparison of the PTO Criticisms Only scenario and the Both
Treatments scenario (38.5% vs. 30.4%; p=0.011)." These results
lend support to the belief of accused infringers that instructing
the jury on the presumption of validity may decrease the
likelihood of an invalidity finding.
As for the conventional assumption that criticisms about the
PTO are highly prejudicial, the results appear to confirm this.
86. See generally GRAHAM CURRELL & ANTONY DOWMAN, ESSENTIAL MATHEMATICS
AND STATISTICS FOR SCIENCE 245 (2005).

87.
88.

See supra Figure 2.
Id.
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The difference in the invalidity rates between the No Treatments
and the PTO Criticisms Only scenarios is statistically significant
(31.7% vs. 38.5%; p=0.035)." In addition, a comparison of the
typical patent case scenario where the presumption instruction is
given (PresumptionOnly) with the scenario where, in addition to
the presumption, PTO criticisms are also introduced (Both
Treatments) reveals a difference in the invalidity rate that is
significant at the 10% level (24.7% vs. 30.4%; p=0.060).90
Of the pair-wise comparisons, perhaps the most intriguing
result is the comparison of the No Treatments and the Both
Treatments scenarios, where the former has neither the
presumption instruction nor the PTO criticisms, while the latter
has both treatments. It appears as if the effects of the two
treatments cancel each other (31.7% vs. 30.4%; p=0.658).91 This
result was unexpected, given that negative information is
generally deemed to carry more weight and exert a stronger
influence than either positive or neutral information."
The difference between the Presumption Only and the PTO
Criticisms Only scenarios was highly statistically significant
(24.7% vs. 38.5%; p < 0.001).93 This result was not unexpected,
given that a comparison of these two scenarios does not reflect
the incremental presence (or absence) of a single treatment, but
rather a direct comparison of the effects of two different
treatments.
To confirm whether the significance levels reported by the pairwise Chi-square comparisons would continue to hold after
and background
demographic
for various
controlling
characteristics of the mock jurors, a series of multiple logistic
regression models were used, as shown in Appendices 3 through
6.1 The dependent variable corresponds to a finding of invalidity
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, Kathleen D. Vohs,
Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 323 (2001) ("When equal
measures of good and bad are present, however, the psychological effects of bad ones
outweigh those of the good ones.").
93. See supra Figure 2.
94. See generally Chao-Ying Joanne Peng, Kuk Lida Lee & Gary M. Ingersoll, An
Introduction to Logistic Regression Analysis and Reporting, 96 J. EDUC. RES. 3, 4 (2002)
("Generally, logistic regression is well suited for describing and testing hypotheses about
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by reason of obviousness. The predictor variables were the
personal
various
and
scenarios
treatment
different
characteristics of the respondents. Overall, the regression models
confirmed the results of the pair-wise comparisons.
In the regression models, each of the four treatment versions of
the hypothetical was represented by a dummy variable, where
one of the versions served as the base variable to which the other
three were compared. For this reason, four general models were
used for the logistic regression:
Table 2: Models and Base Comparison
Variables
Model95

Base Comparison Variable

A
B

No Treatments
Presumption Only

C

PTO Criticisms Only

D

Both Treatments

Of the four Models, Models A and B are of particular interest.
In Model A, the No Treatments scenario is the base comparison
variable to which the other treatment scenarios are compared.
Because the No Treatments scenario does not have any
treatments, it may serve as an intuitive baseline against which
the effects of the other treatments may be evaluated. Model B is
also notable because the base comparison variable (i.e., the
Presumption Only scenario) corresponds to a common scenario in
actual patent trials in which the jury is informed of the
presumption but is not provided any information critical of the
PTO.
Each Model consists of four sub-models, numbered 1 through 4.
Sub-models Al-A4, B1-B4, C1-C4, and D1-D4 use the same
corresponding sets of predictor variables in the regression, except
for the base comparison variable for the treatment scenarios. The
relationships between a categorical outcome variable and one or more categorical or
continuous predictor variables.").
95. For the corresponding logistic regression tables, see infra Appendices 3-6.
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sub-models were created to mitigate or avoid potential
multicollinearity issues." Specifically, the variable "College
Graduate," which indicates whether a respondent's level of
education is at least a college degree, is in a separate sub-model
from one that uses the variable "Science Degree," which indicates
that the respondent has a college or graduate degree in science,
engineering, or mathematics. Similarly, the variable "Jury
Service," which indicates whether a respondent has served on a
jury, is in a different sub-model from the variables "Civil Juror"
and "Criminal Juror,"" which indicate whether a respondent
served on a civil jury or on a criminal jury, respectively. In total,
four sub-models were used to capture the various combinations of
alternative variables (i.e., "College Graduate" vs. "Science
Degree"; "Jury Service" vs. "Civil Juror" and "Criminal Juror").
Turning now to the results of the multiple logistic regression,
Model A reveals that, when compared to the No Treatments
scenario, the Presumption Only scenario decreased the odds, by a
statistically significant margin, that the mock juror in this study
would find invalidity." By contrast, the PTO Criticisms Only
scenario increased the odds of an invalidity finding by a
statistically significant margin." The Both Treatments scenario
did not result in a statistically significant change in the odds."'o

96.

See

ANDREW SIEGEL,

PRACTICAL

BUSINESS

STATISTICS 372

(6th ed. 2012)

(explaining that multicollinearity makes it "difficult for multiple regression to distinguish
between the effect of one variable and the effect of another").
97. Twenty-one respondents served in both civil and criminal cases-they were
counted in both the "Civil Juror" and the "Criminal Juror" variables. Fifteen respondents
served on a jury but were not sure of the type of case-they were included in the "Jury
Service" variable, but not in the "Civil Juror" or the "Criminal Juror" variables.
98. Across Models Al-A4, the odds ratio associated with the Presumption Only
scenario ranged between .6965 and .7022, and the p-value ranged between 0.018 and
0.020. See infra Appendix 3. An odds ratio that is greater than 1.0 refers to an increase in
the odds, while an odds ratio that is less than 1.0 refers to a decrease in the odds. An
Introduction to Odds, Odds Ratios and Exponents, RESTORE @ NATIONAL CENTRE FOR
RESEARCH METHODS (Jul. 25, 2011), http://www.restore.ac.uk/srme/www/fac/soc/wie/resea
rch-new/srme/modules/mod4/2/.
99. Across Models Al-A4, the odds ratio associated with the PTO Criticisms Only
scenario ranged between 1.3604 and 1.3717, and the p-value ranged between 0.027 and
0.031. See infra Appendix 3.
100. Across Models Al-A4, the odds ratio associated with the Both Treatments
scenario ranged between .9329 and .9376, and the p-value ranged between 0.636 and
0.660. See infra Appendix 3.
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These relationships confirm the pair-wise Chi-square analysis
reported earlier.'o
The results for Model B tell a similar story. Compared to the
Presumption Only scenario, which served as the base variable,
the No Treatments scenario resulted in a statistically significant
increase in the odds of an invalidity finding.'02 Unsurprisingly,
the PTO Criticisms Only scenario increased the odds of an
invalidity finding by a highly statistically significant margin
when compared to the Presumption Only scenario.o' The Both
Treatments scenario also increased the odds of an invalidity
finding, but the change was significant only at the 10% level.0 4
These relationships again confirm the earlier pair-wise Chisquare comparisons.o' The results for Models C and D similarly
confirm the relationships reported by the pair-wise Chi-square
analysis, albeit with a change in the significance level of the
difference between the PTO Criticisms Only and the Both
Treatments scenarios from the 5% level (Chi-square) to the 1%
level (logistic regression).'06
In addition to being asked to decide whether the patent in the
hypothetical was invalid for obviousness, the mock jurors were
also asked to specify the likelihood of obviousness on a scale of 0%
(Certainly Not Obvious) to 100% (Certainly Obvious).o' The
"likelihood of obviousness" estimate provides an indication of the
mock jurors' subjective impressions of the strength of the
obviousness arguments presented in the hypothetical. 8 The
101. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87, 89, 91.
102. Across Models B1-B4, the odds ratio associated with the No Treatments scenario
ranged between 1.4241 and 1.4357, and the p-value ranged between 0.018 and 0.020. See
infra Appendix 4.
103. Across Models Bl-B4, the odds ratio associated with the PTO Criticisms Only
scenario ranged between 1.9374 and 1.9694, and p < 0.001. See infra Appendix 4.
104. Across Models B1-B4, the odds ratio associated with the Both Treatments
scenario ranged between 1.3329 and 1.3417, and the p-value ranged between 0.056 and
0.061. See infra Appendix 4.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87, 90, 93.
106. See infra Appendices 5-6; see also supra text accompanying note 88 (reporting the
result of the Chi-Square comparison).
107. See infra Appendix 2.
108. The likelihood estimate also served as another way to check whether the jurors
understood the hypothetical, especially the applicable standard of proof (clear and
convincing). A respondent was eliminated if he answered that the patent was obvious but
separately indicated that the likelihood of obviousness was less than 40%, or,
alternatively, if he found nonobviousness, but indicated that the likelihood of obviousness
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mean likelihood estimates are listed below, tabulated according
to the treatment scenario and the disposition ("Obvious" or "Not
Obvious"):
Table 3: Likelihood of Obviousness (%)
Obvious

Treatment
Scenario

Not Obvious
Mean
(SD)
28.5
301
(1.5

No Treatments

140

Mean
(SD)
78.9
(1.1

Presumption Only

106

78.7
(1.1

324

PTO Criticisms Only

168

268

30.7
(17.1)

Both Treatments

133

79.0
(10.8)
80.8
(1.0

305

31.6
(1.5
(18.5)

(11.1)

(11.1)

(12.0)

Welch ANOVA
WelchANOVAp=0.457
(Across Treatments)

(17.5)
30.5
(1.8
(17.8)

p=0.193

II_

I

To see whether the treatment scenarios might affect the mock
jurors' likelihood estimates, a one-way Welch ANOVA was used
to compare the mean estimates across the four treatment
scenarios for each disposition.o' Notably, a statistically
significant relationship could not be discerned between the mean
likelihood estimates and the treatment scenarios, regardless of
whether obviousness was found (range of means: 78.7% to 80.8%;

p=0.457) or not (range of means: 28.5% to 31.6%; p=0.193)."' This
result

was

somewhat

unexpected,

given

the

statistically

was at least 90%. Only eighteen respondents were excluded on this basis. This question
was adapted from a similar question used by Schwartz and Seaman, who used it as a
check on the respondents' answers in their study. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at
461-62.
109. See generally CURRELL & DOWMAN, supranote 86, at 292.
110. See supra Table 3.
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significant differences in the invalidity rates for various pairs of
treatment scenarios."
The final obviousness-related question asked the mock jurors
to specify the level of confidence in their answers for the two prior
obviousness-related questions, on a scale of one (Not Confident At
All) to seven (Extremely Confident).112 The mean levels of
confidence are reported below:
Table 4: Level of Confidence in Answers
Obvious
Mean
(SD)
5.51

Treatment
Scenario

No Treatments

140

Presumption Only

106

PTO Criticisms Only

168

Both Treatments

133

Welch ANOVA
(Across Treatments)

Not Obvious
Mean
(SD)
5.28

301
(1.12)
5.515.51
324
(1.11)

(.18
(1.18)
5.33
(.17
(1.17)

5.54

5.29
(.2)
(1.12)
5.28
(.22
(1.22)

268

(1.06)
5.40
(1.38)

305

p=0.797

I

I

To determine whether being informed of the presumption
instruction or criticisms about the PTO affected the mock jurors'
overall level of confidence regarding their answers to the
obviousness-related questions, a one-way Welch ANOVA was
used to compare the mean confidence levels across the four
treatment scenarios for each disposition. A statistically
significant relationship could not be discerned between the
confidence levels and the treatment scenarios, whether
obviousness was found (range of means: 5.40 to 5.54; p=0.797) or
not (range of means: 5.28 to 5.33; p=0.931)."3 This result was
111.
112.
113.

See supraFigure 2 and text accompanying notes 86-93.
See infra Appendix 2.
See supraTable 4.
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unexpected, particularly the immaterial difference in mean
confidence levels between the Presumption Only and the PTO
Criticisms Only scenarios. 14 In effect, the treatments did not
appear to make the mock jurors feel more (or less) confident
about their decisions.
B. Other Predictors
In addition to the treatment scenarios, the regression models
included several variables based on the mock jurors' demographic
and background characteristics."' Data on these characteristics
were collected solely based on self-identification.
The regressions revealed no statistically significant effect on
the odds of an invalidity decision based on age."' Because the
median age of the respondents was thirty, it is possible that the
relatively low concentration of older respondents in the sample
might have prevented a statistically significant effect from being
discerned."' Regarding gender, women were far less likely than
men to find invalidity-this difference was highly statistically
significant."' This result confirms a similar finding in Schwartz
and Seaman's experiment relating to the standard of proof."' One
potential explanation for the significance of gender might be the
subject matter of the patent in the hypothetical: it is possible that
men may feel more comfortable than women in second-guessing a
patent examiner on an invention relating to golf. With respect to
race, minorities were more likely to find invalidity than whites by
a margin that was significant at the 10% level.'20 Although
Schwartz and Seaman's study did not report any significance
based on race,121 the finding of significance at the 10% level in the
114. See supra Table 4.
115. See infra Appendices 3-6.
116. Across the various models, the p-value ranged between 0.158 and 0.248. See infra
Appendices 3-6.
117. For example, only 146 out of 1745 respondents (8.4%) were aged fifty-five and
over. In contrast, 25.8% of the U.S. population was aged fifty-five and over in 2012. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 tbl.1 (2013),

available at http://www.census.gov/population/age/data/files/2012/2012gender-tablel.xlsx.
2
118. Across the various models, p=0.00 . See infra Appendices 3-6.
43,
at 479-80.
note
119. Schwartz & Seaman, supra
120. Across the various models, the p-value ranged between 0.053 and 0.071. See infra
Appendices 3-6.
121. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 479-80.
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present study might be partly attributable to the much larger
sample size (N=1745) compared to that of Schwartz and Seaman's
study (N=500).'22 More generally, given the nature of the
hypothetical, it is possible that the gender and race effects 2 8 in
this study may reflect differences among the socio-demographic
groups regarding their willingness to second-guess government
agencies, as well as their attitudes toward golf, corporate
defendants, and the patent system. A detailed exploration of the
socio-demographic aspects of jury decision-making in patent cases
is left to future research.
Concerning experience relevant to the subject matter of the
hypothetical, the respondents were asked whether they had
played golf: 955 out of 1745 (55%) had. Golf experience, however,
did not have a statistically significant effect on invalidity
122. Id. at 456.
123. At a conference at which this article was presented, a commenter asked whether
eliciting gender and race information before the hypothetical could generate "stereotype
threat" that might affect the results. As mentioned previously, very basic demographic
questions were posed at the beginning of the survey, similar to those found in the
questionnaires that are given to prospective jurors in preparation for voir dire. See supra
note 52. Stereotype threat is theorized to occur when an individual is put in a situation
that triggers anxiety about confirming negative stereotypes about his or her sociodemographic group, such as situations that test the math ability of female students or the
academic performance of black students. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How
Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 614
(1997). However, experimental studies of the effect of inquiring about gender and ethnicity
prior to taking tests have yielded mixed results. Compare Claude M. Steele & Joshua
Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797, 807-08 (1995) (finding stereotype threat effect),
with Lawrence J. Stricker & William C. Ward, Stereotype Threat, Inquiring About Test
Takers' Ethnicity and Gender, and Standardized Test Performance, 34 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 665, 665 (2004) (finding no statistical or practical significance).
In this study, the risk of stereotype threat appears to be minimal, given the
noncompetitive, nonevaluative nature of the subject matter of the experiment. In addition,
it may be instructive to compare the results from Schwartz and Seaman's experiment with
those of this study, which uses a slightly modified version of the hypothetical and
obviousness questions from Schwartz and Seaman's experiment. Specifically, Schwartz
and Seaman's study asked for the respondents' demographic information at the end of the
survey and their data showed a highly statistically significant effect on obviousness
decisions based on gender. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 452, 479. In the current
study, the gender question was presented at the beginning of the survey, and the data
similarly revealed a highly statistically significant effect based on gender. See infra
Appendices 3-6. With respect to race, Schwartz and Seaman's study did not report a
statistically significant effect, Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 479, while in the
current study, race was significant only at the 10% level. See infra Appendices 3-6. As
mentioned above, this may be partly attributable to the much larger sample size used in
the current study (N = 1745) compared to that of Schwartz and Seaman's study (N=500).
See supranote 122 and accompanying text.
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decisions,'24 which confirms a similar finding by Schwartz and
Seaman."' With respect to personal experiences relating to
patents, only one respondent had served as a juror in a patent
case; nine had either applied for or owned a patent; and twentyfive had work experience, expertise, or training in patent law. In
total, only thirty-five respondents out of 1745 (2%) had any
personal experience relating to patents. Given its relative rarity,
patent experience was not included as a variable in the
regression models because any indication (or absence) of
statistical significance was unlikely to be reliable.
With respect to educational background, there was no
statistically significant difference in the odds of an invalidity
decision depending on whether the mock juror was a college
graduate (1035 out of 1745; 59%) or had a degree (college or
graduate) in science, engineering, or mathematics (316 out of
1745; 18%).126 This confirms a similar finding by Schwartz and
Seaman.2 7 There were twenty-nine respondents (1.7%) who
attended (or were currently attending) law school. A "Law School"
variable was not included in the regression models because of
reliability concerns arising from the low cell count.
Regarding jury service, 263 respondents (15%) had previously
served on a jury, of which ninety-five served in a civil case, 132
served in a criminal case, twenty-one served in both types of
cases, and fifteen were unsure of the type of case in which they
served. By way of comparison to the overall population,
approximately a quarter of adults in the United States have
served on a jury.128 The lower jury service percentage in the
dataset might be an artifact of the respondents' median age being
only thirty. Indeed, the respondents who had served on juries
were older (median/mean age: 40/41.5) than those who had not
(median/mean age: 29/32.7) by a highly statistically significant
margin.129 As a further comparison, the median age of individuals
124. See infra Appendices 3-6.
125. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 479-80.
126. See infra Appendices 3-6.
127. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 479-80.
128. Regina A. Corso, Just Under Three in Five Americans Believe Juries Can Be Fair
and Impartial All or Most of the Time, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Just-Under-Three-in-FiveAmericans-Believe-Juries-2008-O1.pdf.
129. According to a t-test assuming unequal variances, the difference in the means is

444

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:417

who were empaneled as jurors in the previously-mentioned 2004
study in King County, Washington, was forty-eight.' For these
reasons, the results relating to the possible impact of jury service
should be evaluated cautiously. With the foregoing caveat in
mind, the regression models reveal no statistically significant
difference in the odds that a respondent would find invalidity
based on the mere fact of prior jury service.' However, when
comparisons were made based on the type of jury service, the
respondents who had served on a civil jury'3 2 were less likely to
find invalidity than someone who either had served on a criminal
jury or had not served at all, by a margin that was significant at
the 10% level.'"' In contrast, service on a criminal jury 34 did not
have any statistically significant effect on the outcome. "' One
possible explanation for these results might be that the 10%
significance level for civil jurors is an artifact of the sample size.
Another potential explanation might be that former civil jurors
who likely have had prior experience applying the preponderance
standard might have taken a more rigorous view of the clear and
convincing standard (compared to the other respondents) upon
being informed in the hypothetical that the latter standard is
higher than the former. In contrast, the respondents who have
not served on a civil jury may not have a preexisting set point
with respect to the preponderance standard such that their
conceptual threshold of whether the clear and convincing
standard was satisfied might have been lower or more fluid.
In summary, the strongest predictors of whether an individual
juror would find invalidity in this study were the treatment
scenarios and gender. The gender predictor should be interpreted
with caution because of the potentially gendered nature of the
subject matter of the hypothetical patent-in-suit (golf balls). The
effects of race and prior service on a civil jury were significant
highly statistically significant: p < 0.0001.
130. GASTILETAL., supra note 77, at 61, tbl.4.2.
131. As represented by the "Jury Service" variable in the regression models. See infra
Appendices 3-6.
132. As represented by the "Civil Juror" variable in the regression models. See infra
Appendices 3-6.
133. Across the various models, the p-value ranged between 0.080 and 0.083. See infra
Appendices 3-6.
134. As represented by the "Criminal Juror" variable in the regression models. See
infra Appendices 3-6.
135.

See infra Appendices 3-6.
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only at the 10% level, and no statistically significant
relationships could be discerned for age, education, service on a
criminal jury, and experience related to the subject matter of the
hypothetical patent-in-suit. However, in light of the absence of
group deliberation in this study, caution is warranted before
drawing any firm conclusions about the relative impact (or lack
thereof) of any of these variables on case outcomes.'
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The results of this study confirm, in large part, the perceptions
of litigants and trial judges on the likely impact of informing the
jury of the presumption of validity and presenting information
critical of the PTO during trial. Specifically, the data show that
the presumption instruction and criticisms of the PTO each have
statistically significant effects on the rate at which the mock
jurors found the hypothetical patent-in-suit invalid for
obviousness."' On the whole, each of the treatments appears to
have an effect on the invalidity rate that may be tantamount to
an incremental, yet material, change in the standard of proof for
invalidity.
The impact of the PTO criticisms on the results arguably
supports the prevailing view among judges that such information
may be highly prejudicial.' 8 Because the overwhelming majority
of mock jurors did not have any personal experience with the
patent system,' it is possible that they were highly susceptible to
being influenced by any information on the PTO, whether
positive or negative. The data do not reveal the extent to which
the impact of the PTO criticisms might have been attributable to
the jurors' susceptibility to being influenced based on their lack of
familiarity with the agency, as opposed to the negativity in the
message imparted by the criticisms. Because only 2% of the mock
jurors had any personal experience with the patent system, it
was not possible to determine reliably from the data whether
they might have been less affected by the criticisms than those
136.
137.
138.
139.
system.

See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Of the 1745 respondents, only thirty-five (2%) had any experience with the patent
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who had no familiarity with the agency. Accordingly, future
research may explore whether and to what extent a relationship
may exist between the jurors' level of familiarity with the patent
system and the degree to which their decisions may be influenced
by the presentation of related information that is either positive,
negative, neutral, or some combination thereof.
With respect to the effect of the presumption instruction, the
optional nature of instructing jurors on the presumption of
validity under current Federal Circuit law 4 o introduces the
possibility for different outcomes on validity issues depending on
whether a presumption instruction was given. This would be a
concern primarily in close cases, which generally are the ones
that go to trial.'4 ' If some district courts consistently instruct the
jury on the presumption of validity, while others do not, the
presumption instruction could become another factor in the
calculus of forum shopping in patent litigation.142 In light of these
concerns, the district courts might adopt a norm of either
including the presumption instruction in every case or excluding
it. The difficulty, however, lies in selecting a norm.
From a procedural standpoint, one possible justification for
adopting a norm of including the presumption instruction may be
that, to the extent it sends a strong signal that patents should not
be invalidated lightly, it may help reinforce the message to the
jury that the clear and convincing standard associated with
deciding validity issues is more rigorous than the preponderance
standard associated with deciding other issues in the case, such
as infringement. Relatedly, given that patent trials are complex
proceedings where the jury is presented with evidence and
arguments on multiple topics, the presumption instruction may
serve as a procedural safeguard that decreases the likelihood that

140. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
141. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) ("In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the outcome
leads parties to drop out.").
142. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001) ("The empirical
results presented in this Article demonstrate that despite the creation of the Federal
Circuit, choice of forum continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent
litigation.").
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the jury will decide validity issues based on considerations other
than the pertinent evidence.'43
Conversely, other procedural considerations may support the
contrary norm of excluding any mention of the presumption. For
example, the presumption instruction may be confusing to lay
jurors who might mistakenly accord it evidentiary weight or
otherwise misinterpret it."' In addition, one possible explanation
for the disparity in the invalidity rates between the No
Treatments and the Presumption Only scenarios might be that
the presumption unfairly discourages jurors from secondguessing the PTO, over and above the level of deference built into
the clear and convincing standard for proving invalidity.'
Indeed, omitting the presumption instruction may allow the
standard of proof to be effectively recalibrated-without requiring
any change in the law-to a lower level that may better reflect
the realities of the examination process at the PTO that have
raised concerns about patent quality.146
By deciding to include (or exclude) the presumption
instruction, a district court is effectively selecting a validity
baseline, which may affect the extent to which the clear and
convincing standard becomes more (or less) difficult to satisfy.
Because the choice of a validity baseline reflects, in part, a
normative judgment concerning whether invalidating a patent
should be made easier or more difficult, it should not rest solely
on the procedural benefits associated with each option. Ideally,
the respective error costs should also be considered: A critical
characteristic of each baseline is the relative level of false
positives and false negatives. In the present context, a false
143. This is somewhat analogous to the role played by an instruction on the
presumption of innocence in a criminal trial, where the presumption acts as a safeguard
against "a genuine danger that the jury would convict ... on the basis of ... extraneous
considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial." Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478, 488 (1978).
144.

See supra note 29.

145. See, e.g., Bohrer,supra note 17, at 282-83.
146. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 49 (suggesting that presumption of
validity be changed "to more accurately reflect the realities of current patent practice");
see also FTC Report, supra note 66, at 8 ("[Tlhe PTO is underfunded, and PTO patent
examiners all too often do not have sufficient time to evaluate patent applications fully.
These circumstances suggest that an overly strong presumption of a patent's validity is
inappropriate. Rather, courts should require only a 'preponderance of the evidence' to
rebut the presumption of validity.").
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positive, also called a "Type I" error, occurs if a valid patent is
erroneously invalidated.1' A false negative, which is a "Type II"
error, occurs when the court fails to invalidate a patent with a
validity defect.148
Looking at the two baseline options at a high level, the
incidence of Type I errors is expected to increase (or decrease)
when the presumption instruction is omitted (or included), in
light of the resultsl 49 suggesting that this baseline would
effectively impose a lower (or higher) standard of proof than the
alternative. For Type II errors, the inverse relationship may hold.
Given the infeasibility of eliminating either type of error, the
selection of a baseline would necessarily be informed by a need to
strike the optimal balance of Type I and Type II errors. Presently,
differing opinions exist as to which type of error should be
prioritized for avoidance. Some commentators, drawing on
comparative error analysis from antitrust law,5 o suggest that
Type I errors may be more problematic than Type II errors on the
theory that the former is less amenable to correction through
market forces than the latter."' In addition, a high Type I error
rate is thought to introduce a level of uncertainty in patent
protection that could dissuade some patentees-particularly
those in the pharmaceutical industry-from investing in research
and commercialization." 2 By contrast, other commentators have

147. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens:
The "Suggestion Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1564 n.271.
148. Id.
149. See supra Part III.A.
150. Error analysis in antitrust law classifies a Type I error as behavior wrongly
classified as illegal and a Type II error as a monopoly that is wrongly permitted. See Fred
S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:Competition for and in the Field of
Antitrust Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1412-13 (2003).
151. See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust:
On "Probabilistic"Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST ABA, at 68, 74 (2003)
("Unlike Type II error ... Type I error in the patent system cannot be corrected."); see also
McChesney, supra note 150, at 1413 ("Type I error ... is not subject to much selfcorrection. If liability is imposed on conduct that actually is beneficial (that is, competitive
innocents are punished), there is no market corrective for judicial mistake. Only judicial
reversal of the case or legislative intervention to change the decision will undo the Type I
error."); Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 972, 977 (1986) ("[Flalse positives are much more harmful than false negatives.
Market processes undercut monopolies wrongfully permitted, but no similar processes
undercut judicial decisions that wrongly condemn efficient conduct.").
152. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 52 (summarizing patentees'
rationale for strong presumption of validity).
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observed a weak causal relationship between patents and
innovation (at least in some industries),' and have concluded
that Type II errors are more problematic on the basis that they
impede follow-on innovation and produce pricing distortions. A
detailed analysis that quantifies and compares the relative harms
of each error type for the purposing of informing a normative
preference for a particular validity baseline is left for future
research.
At bottom, in every trial involving a validity issue, a validity
baseline specific to that case will be established based on the
information presented to the jury. The decision to include or
exclude certain information that may materially affect the
baseline is a policy-based assessment that should be informed not
only by procedural considerations but also by the relative costs of
erroneously invalidating patent claims versus erroneously
upholding them. Although the results of this study cannot
definitively answer the question of which baseline should be
chosen among the various treatment configurations, it highlights
the need for further empirical research on validity error costs
that may allow a court that is faced with a choice between two (or
more) legally-permissible procedural options to choose the one
that optimizes the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors.

153. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
PatentSystem: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255,
1283 (2009) ("Given that the patent monopoly is most commonly justified on the ground of
providing incentives to innovate, we were surprised to find that, in general, the technology
startup executives responding to our survey report that patents offer relatively mixed to
weak incentives to engage in innovation."); FTC REPORT, supra note 66, at ch. 3, 33-38.
154. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness: A Comment on Three
Learned Papers, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 431, 435 (2008) ("Type II errors take material
out of the public domain, increase patent thickets and transaction costs, act as barriers to
entry and to cumulative research, and encourage trolling. But while type I errors may be
bad for the inventor, they can be very advantageous to society."); Ian Ayres, & Paul
Klemperer, Limiting Patentee's Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives:
The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985,
1019-20 (1999). ("Enforcing invalid patents creates ex post pricing distortions without
enhancing innovation, while our model showed that failing to enforce otherwise-valid
patents could reduce the ex post distortions without reducing, or without substantially
reducing, innovation incentives.").
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V. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

There are several aspects of this study that may limit its
external validity.
First, a notable difference between the survey flow and the
order of proceedings in some courts is that, at the beginning of
the trial, the jury will be shown an informational video about the
55
PTO that is produced by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC").'
The FJC video has received mixed reviews from practitioners,
some of whom believe the video helps the patentee more than the
accused infringer.' The FJC video was not used in this study
because it would have more than doubled the length of the survey
(the video itself is eighteen minutes long), and overly long
surveys may adversely affect the number and quality of
respondents. Because the presumption of validity is grounded in
the concept of administrative correctness, the content of the FJC
video may be relevant to the extent that it provides an extended
discussion of the process of obtaining a patent at the PTO. Future
research could explore whether the relationships reported in this
article would still hold if the FJC video were shown to mock
jurors.
Second, the mode of presenting information to the mock jurors
is substantially different from real life. During actual trials,
information is presented live to the jury in both audible and
visual forms, which may affect the retention and salience of
For the survey experiment, the
certain information.'
hypothetical was provided as a text document because the survey
was conducted online and one of the goals was to minimize any
considerations that would discourage participation. Presenting
the hypothetical as a video might have been more realistic;
however, it might have limited the respondent pool to those
individuals who had both access to sufficient bandwidth and the
opportunity to watch a video that would have been several
155. See, e.g., John D. Gilleland, The Debate Is On: Is the Federal Judicial Center's
Patent Tutorial Video Too Pro-Plaintiff?,TrialGraphix 2 (May 1, 2012), available at http://
www.trialgraphix.com/SiteAssets/file/Articles/patent-tutorial-video-too-proplaintiff-john-

gilleland.pdf.
156. See id. ("Defense teams claim the video is too pro-plaintiff in that it dedicates a
good chunk of its running time to extolling the virtues of the patent system. . .
157. Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 470-71.
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minutes long. In addition, because individuals who respond to
Internet surveys often do so while at work, presenting the
hypothetical as a video might have dissuaded some respondents
from participating if they wanted to avoid getting caught
watching videos at work.
Third, juries deliberate in groups, not individually, such that
the decisions of many separate individuals might not be
representative of a decision reached by a group."' For example,
research suggests that the perceived influence of women and
minorities in jury deliberation may be lower than that of white
men.'"' Moreover, the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts 60
may have a significant influence on group deliberation that may
not be reflected in the results of this study. To explore these
issues further, future research could use group deliberation for
mock jurors with varying demographic compositions.
Fourth, unlike a real trial, which presents a substantial
amount of information to the jury over several days,'"' the
relative brevity of the experiment 2 may enhance the prominence
of the treatments, which may skew the results to show a greater
effect than may be possible under real-life circumstances."'
Indeed, the hypothetical is not representative of the level of
complexity in a typical patent trial. Juries in actual patent trials
are usually asked to render a verdict on multiple issues (e.g.,
infringement, invalidity, remedies), often for multiple claims (if
not multiple patents), as opposed to only a single issue
(obviousness) for a single patent as in this study.'6 4 As such,
158. See id. at 471.
159. See, e.g., Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics:To What
Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 22, 28-29 (1980); see also
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of
JurorRace on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 98-99 (1993) (summarizing research
relating to influence of minority jurors).
160. Patent cases are heard in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012), in which jury
verdicts must be unanimous. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b) ("Unless the parties stipulate otherwise,
the verdict must be unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least 6 members.").
161. See Mark A. Lemley, Jamie Kendall & Clint Martin, Rush to Judgment? Trial
Length and Outcomes in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169, 177 (2013) (reporting that
patent jury trials take on average 8.6 days).

162.

On average, the mock jurors took 12.3 minutes to complete the survey.

163. See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?,
104 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 226, 227 (2010).
164. E.g., Wendy Kaufman, Jury to Decide Apple's Patent Case Against Samsung, NPR
(Aug. 22, 2012, 4:50 AM) http://www.npr.org/2012/08/22/159679099/jury-to-decide-apple-s-
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concerns about juror confusion are common in patent cases, given
the number of issues being presented."' For this reason, in a real
trial, it is possible that the impact of the presumption instruction
and the criticisms about the PTO may be far less salient than the
results from the experiment suggest. Future research could
explore the impact of the treatments using longer hypotheticals
that ask mock jurors to decide multiple issues.
Finally, even if the hypothetical were presented in a more
realistic manner, the mock jurors would still be aware that their
decisions would not have real-world consequences, which may
affect the results."' For future research, an analysis of actual jury
verdicts where invalidity was decided may help avoid issues
related to "the consequentiality of the task" in using
simulations.'6 7 One caveat with analyzing actual jury data is that
the complexity and variations among real-life cases may render it
difficult to reliably identify and isolate the impact of the
presumption instruction on case outcomes.
CONCLUSION

The results of the survey experiment reported in this article
suggest that informing the jury of the presumption of validity, as
opposed to not mentioning the presumption, could have a
substantial impact on the jury's decision on invalidity issues.
Specifically, the presence or absence of the presumption
instruction may have an effect that is comparable to an
incremental change in the standard of proof for invalidity. The
results also suggest that similar effects in the opposite direction
may occur when jurors are exposed to criticisms of the PTO.
Because a jury instruction on the presumption is optional under
Federal Circuit law so long as the jury is informed of the clear
and convincing standard for proving invalidity, the effect of the
patent-case-against-samsung (reporting that, in light of case complexity, judge "worries
that the jury will be 'seriously confused.'").
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., David L. Breau & Brian Brook, "Mock" Mock Juries: A Field Experiment
on the Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 89 (2007)

(reporting results of experiment finding that "mock jurors might be less emotionally
invested in their task than real jurors" and that "this translated into completely opposite
verdicts from almost identical trials, apparently stemming from the fact that one jury
believed the consequences of its decision were real while the other knew they were not").
167. Id. at 80 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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presumption instruction raises concerns about forum shopping,
particularly in the absence of a consensus among judges on
whether the presumption instruction should be included. A
consensus is unlikely to be reached in the absence of further
research that quantifies the relative error costs associated with
including or omitting the presumption instruction.
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APPENDIX 1: HYPOTHETICAL

OVERVIEW OF THE DISPUTE
This dispute is between Acme Golf, Inc., and Bravo Sporting
Goods Company. Acme and Bravo are competing manufacturers
of golf balls.
Historically, golf balls consisted of two parts: a solid core and a
cover-layer with dimples. Some balls had a relatively hard plastic
cover-layer because they were designed to travel long distances
when struck by a club. However, this hard cover created an
undesirable "feel" when struck, and made it difficult for some
golfers to control the ball's direction or spin. In contrast, other
balls had a soft cover-layer made of polyurethane in order to
provide the proper "feel" when struck and greater control for
shorter shots. But soft-cover balls had the disadvantage of
travelling less distance than their hard-cover counterparts, and
were less durable. Both hard-cover and soft-cover balls were well
known in the field since at least the 1950s.
In 2005, Acme designed a three-piece golf ball with: (1) a solid
core, (2) a hard inner layer, and (3) a softer outer cover-layer of
polyurethane covered with dimples. This three-piece design
resulted in a "dual personality" ball capable of traveling long
distances due to the hard inner layer, but also had the desirable
control and "feel" characteristics of soft-cover balls due to the
polyurethane cover-layer. Acme timely applied for a patent on
this three-piece golf ball in 2005.
In the United States, patents are granted by the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, also known as the PTO, which is an agency of
the federal government. To obtain a patent, one must first file a
patent application with the PTO. A technically-trained patent
examiner then reviews it to determine whether the claimed
invention is patentable. During this process, the patent examiner
searches for and reviews certain information called "prior art,"
which is any publicly-available information about the technology
existing before the date the patent application was filed. The
patent examiner reviews the "prior art" to determine whether the
claimed invention is truly an advance over existing technology.
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One requirement for obtaining a patent is that the invention is
not "obvious" in light of the prior art. A claimed invention is
"obvious" if an ordinary-skilled person in the relevant field of
technology-who was familiar with the prior art-would have
also been able to come up with the invention at the time the
invention was made.
In this case, the patent examiner reviewed the prior art
regarding both hard- and soft-cover golf balls. The prior art the
patent examiner reviewed included a patent granted to an
inventor named Charles in 2000-which is five years prior to
when Acme invented its golf ball. The prior art Charles patent
discloses a three-piece golf ball with a solid core, a hard inner
layer, and an outer cover-layer consisting of a very hard resin
covered with dimples. This hard resin surface had the advantage
of making the golf ball extremely durable. The Charles patent
does not mention polyurethane, nor does it suggest trying to use a
softer material for the outer cover-layer of the ball. After
reviewing the prior art, including the Charles patent, the patent
examiner determined that Acme's three-piece golf ball was not
obvious and allowed a patent to be issued to Acme.
Earlier this year, Acme sued Bravo for selling golf balls that
allegedly infringe Acme's patent. In response, Bravo has asserted
that Acme's patent is invalid for obviousness in light of the prior
art-that is, the technology already in existence at the time Acme
invented its golf ball. Under the patent law, there is no liability
for infringement if the invention claimed in a patent would have
been obvious.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
BRAVO'S ARGUMENTS:
Bravo argues that Acme's patent is invalid for obviousness
because it merely combines pre-existing items that were already
well-known in the prior art. Specifically, Bravo claims that the
prior art Charles patent discloses a three-piece golf ball with
inner and outer layers of different hardness. It would have been
obvious to an ordinary golf ball manufacturer, Bravo contends, to
modify the Charles three-piece ball to have a soft, outer coverlayer of polyurethane, which has been widely used in traditional
two-piece soft-cover balls since the 1950s. Because of this
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polyurethane cover, a golf ball maker would expect such a ball to
have the desirable control and "feel" characteristics of soft-cover
balls. Bravo argues that the jury should not defer to the patent
examiner's conclusion that the Acme three-piece ball was
patentable because the patent examiner did not thoroughly
analyze the prior art. In short, Bravo argues that the patent
examiner made a mistake in allowing Acme's patent to issue.
I[[That the patent examiner might have made a mistake should
not be surprising. As recognized by numerous academic
researchers, poor patent quality is a serious problem. The PTO is
underfunded and has a backlog of approximately 600,000 patent
applications that are awaiting examination. The patent
examiners are overworked, and are simply not given enough time
to review patent applications thoroughly. Indeed, according to
one academic study, about half of all patents that are litigated in
court are found to be invalid.]]
ACME'S ARGUMENTS:
Acme argues that its patent is not obvious for several reasons.
Acme asserts that none of the prior art discloses the combination
of items that resulted in the patented invention. Acme contends
that this combination is worthy of a patent because it creates a
golf ball with the unique benefits of the control and "feel" of a
two-piece soft-cover ball, combined with the long distance of a
hard-cover ball. Acme insists that nothing in the prior art
suggests that this combination would create a ball with these
favorable characteristics. According to Acme, the prior art
Charles patent does not make Acme's patented invention obvious
because the golf balls in the Charles patent were designed to
solve a very different problem-the lack of durability. Acme
further claims that there is nothing in the Charles patent that
would suggest to an ordinary golf ball manufacturer that using a
softer cover like polyurethane on a three-piece ball might be a
good idea. Finally, Acme argues that the jury should defer to the
decision of the technically-trained patent examiner, who was in

'This is the treatment block that contains criticisms about the PTO. This block was
present in the following versions of the hypothetical: PTO Criticisms Only and Both
Treatments.
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the best position to determine whether Acme's claimed invention
was obvious.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DECIDING OBVIOUSNESS
There are several rules you must follow in deciding whether
Acme's patent is invalid for obviousness. The fact that the PTO
grants a patent on a claimed invention does not necessarily mean
that it in fact deserves protection under the patent laws. A party
can argue in court that it is not liable for infringement because
the patent is invalid. Here, Bravo is arguing that Acme's patent
is invalid on the ground that the patent examiner made an error
in determining that Acme's invention was not obvious.
"[[Under the law, Acme's patent is presumed to be valid. In
other words, it is presumed to have been properly granted. When
a party attacking the validity of a patent relies on prior art that
was specifically considered by the patent examiner, that party
bears the burden of overcoming the deference due a qualified
government agency official who is presumed to have performed
his or her job correctly. The presumption of validity that is
accorded a duly-issued patent can be overcome by "clear and
convincing" evidence of obviousness. In other words,]] [[I]]n"'
order to prevail, Bravo must persuade you that the claimed
invention in the Acme patent is obvious by "clear and convincing"
evidence.
"Clear and convincing" evidence means that it is highly
probable that a factual assertion is true. This is a higher
standard of proof than a "preponderance of the evidence," which
means "more probable than not." However, "clear and convincing"
evidence is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
used in criminal cases.
An invention is "obvious" if a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant technical field-who knew about the prior art and the
state of technology that existed at the time the invention was
" This is the treatment block that mentions the presumption of validity. This block was
present in the following versions of the hypothetical: Presumption Only and Both
Treatments.
When the presumption treatment block was present, this word was spelled "in."
Otherwise, it was spelled "In."
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made-would have also come up with the invention at that time.
In deciding obviousness, you must avoid using hindsight; that is,
you should not consider what is known today or what was learned
from the teachings of Acme's patent. In addition, you should not
use Acme's patent as a road map for selecting and combining
items of prior art.
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APPENDIX 2: OBVIOUSNESS QUESTIONSv
Bl. In your opinion, did Bravo prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Acme's patent was obvious?
Yes (Obvious)
No (Not Obvious)

B2. On a scale of 0% to 100%, how likely do you think it is that Acme's
patent was obvious?
0

10

20

30

|

1

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

Certainly
Not Obvious

|

Equally
Likely To
Be Obvious
or Not
Obvious

Certainly
Obvious

B3. On a scale of 1 to 7, how confident are you in your answers to the
previous two questions (Questions B1 and B2)?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I

I

I

1

I

I

Not Confident
At All

Moderately
Confident

Extremely
Confident

" The questions were adapted from Schwartz and Seaman's study, with slight
modifications in the wording and order. See Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 43, at 478.
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APPENDIX 3: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS A1-A4v

Variable
No Treatments
PresumptionOnly
T OCriticismsOnly

Age

Model Al Model A2 Model A3 Model A4
.7022*

.7012*

.6965*

.6975*

(.1071)

(.1069)

(.1063)

(.1065)

1.3604*

1.3633*

1.3717*

1.3686*

(.1947)

(.1951)

(.1964)

(.1960)

.9360

.9376

.9346

.9329

(.1372)

(.1375)

(.1372)

(.1370)

.9935

.9933

.9942

.9944

(.0048)

(.0048)

(.0048)

(.0048)

.7157"

.7144*

.7115"

.7125*

(.0779)

(.0780)

(.0777)

(.0776)

1.2582'

1.2558

1.2723'

1.2753'

Minority

(.1581)

(.1582)

(.1605)

(.1605)

.9869

.9832

.9865

.9902

GolfPlayer

(.1076)

(.1070)

(.1074)

(.1080)

College Graduate

.9426
.1007)
(.1007)

Science Degree
.1.0215
Jury Service

--

105

(.1560)

Civil Juror

---.

Criminal Juror

---

Prob > Chi2
Pseudo R2

---

.9445
.1011
(.1011)

1.0015

1.0091

(.1361)

(.1373)

1.0189
1.89

---

---

6676'
(.1543)

.6701'
(.1547)

(.1558)

1.1885
(.2234)

1.1929
(.2241)

.6693

.6536

.6384

.6542

(.1393)
<0.0001
0.0173

(.1347)
<0.0001
0.0172

(.1318)
<0.0001
0.0190

(.1363)
<0.0001
0.0191

' In Models Al-A4, the No Treatments scenario is the base comparison variable to which
the other treatment scenarios were compared. Odds ratios are reported with (standard
errors). Significance levels: t: p < 0.10; *:p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
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APPENDIX 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS B11-B4v"

Variable

Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4
1.4241*
(.2171)

1.4262*
(.2174)

1.4357*
(.2191)

1.4336*
(.2188)

1.9374*'
(.2908)

1.9444*'
(.2917)

1.9694**
(.2960)

1.9621"'
(.2951)

1.3329t
(.2047)

1.3372'
(.2052)

.9935
(.0048)

.9933
(.0048)

1.3417'
(.2062)
.9942
(.0048)

.7157"
(.0779)

.7144*
(.0780)
1.2558'
(.1582)
.9832
(.1070)

.7115"
(.0777)
1.2723'
(.1605)
.9865
(.1074)

1.3375'
(.2057)
.9944
(.0048)
.7125"
(.0776)
1.2753'
(.1605)
.9902
(.1080)
.9445
.1011
(.1011)

---

Presumption Only
PTO Criticisms Onl

1.2582'
(.1581)

College Graduate

.9869
(.1076)
.9426
.1007)
(.1007)
---

Science Degree
Jury Service

1.0L215
105

(.1560)

1L0015
1.01--09

(.1373)

1.0189
1.89

---

---

6676'
(.1543)

.6701
(.1547)

(.1558)

1.1885

---

Criminal Juror

1.0091

(.1361)

-.

Civil Juror

Prob > Chi2
Pseudo R2

---

1.1929

(.2234)

(.2241)

.4700
(.0994)

.4583
(.0957)

.4447
(.0932)

.4563
(.0968)

<0.0001
0.0173

<0.0001
0.0172

<0.0001
0.0190

<0.0001
0.0191

" In Models B1-B4, the Presumption Only scenario is the base comparison variable to
which the other treatment scenarios were compared. Odds ratios are reported with
(standard errors). Significance levels:

t: p

< 0.10; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
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APPENDIX 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS C1-C4"

Variable
No Treatments
Presumption Only
PTO Criticisms Only
BothTreatnments
Age

Minority
GolflPlayer
College Graduate
Science Degree
.1.0215
Jury Service

Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4
.7307*
.7290*
.7335*
.7351*
(.1052)
(.1049)
(.1044)
(.1046)
.5097"'
.5078"'
.5143"'
.5162"'
(.0775)
(.0772)
(.0763)
(.0766)
--.6817"
.6813"
.6877
.6880
s
(.0991)
(.0991)
(.0984)
(.0984)
.9944
.9942
.9933
.9935
(.0048)
(.0048)
(.0048)
(.0048)
.7125"
.7144*
.7115*
.7157"
(.0776)
(.0777)
(.0780)
(.0779)
1.2582'

1 . 2 5 5 8t

1.2723'

1. 2 7 53'

(.1581)
.9869
(.1076)
.9426
(.1007)

(.1582)
.9832
(.1070)

(.1605)
.9865
(.1074)

(.1605)
.9902
(.1080)
.9445
(.1011)

1.0015
(.1361)
1.0189
1.89

1.0091
(.1373)

105

(.1560)

Civil Juror

---

Criminal Juror

---

Constant
Prob > Chi2
Pseudo R 2

---

---

(.1543)

(.1547)

(.1558)

---.

6701'

1.1885

1.1929

(.2234)

(.2241)

.8954
(.1849)
< 0.0001
0.0191

.9105
(.1876)

.8911
(.1820)

.8757
(.1793)

< 0.0001
0.0173

< 0.0001
0.0172

< 0.0001
0.0190

v In Models C1-C4, the PTO CriticismsOnly scenario is the base comparison variable to
which the other treatment scenarios were compared. Odds ratios are reported with
(standard errors). Significance levels: t: p < 0.10; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
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APPENDIX 6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS

Variable

Model D1 Model D2 Model D3 Model D4

Both Treatments

College Graduate

1.0684

1.0665

1.0700

1.0719

(.1567)

(.1563)

.7502'
(.1152)

.7478'
(.1148)

(.1571)
.7453t

(.1574)
.7477t

(.1145)

1.4535"

1.4541'

1.4678"

(.2095)

(.2096)

(.2120)

(.1150)
1.4670"
(.2119)

.9935
(.0048)

.9933
(.0048)

.9942
(.0048)

.9944
(.0048)

.7157*
(.0779)

.7144"
(.0780)

.7115"
(.0777)

L.2582t
(.1581)

1.2558'
(.1582)

1.2723'
(.1605)

.9869
(.1076)
.9426
.1007)

.9832
(.1070)

.9865
(.1074)

.7125"
(.0776)
1.2753'
(.1605)
.9902
(.1080)
.9445
.1011

1.0015

1LOO91
1.91

--

_-_-_-

(.1007)

(.1011)

---

105
(.1361)

105
(.1560)

1.89
(.1558)

Civil Juror

---

---.

Criminal Juror

---

Science Degree
Jury Service

Prob> Chi2

Pseudo R

D1-D4"

.1.0215

1.0189

---

(.1373)
---

(.1543)
1.1885

---

6701'
(.1547)
1.1929

(.2234)

(.2241)

.6264
(.1297)

.6129
(.1260)

.5966
(.1229)

.6103
(.1266)

< 0.0001

<0.0001

< 0.0001

< 0.0001

0.0173

0.0172

0.0190

0.0191

"" In Models D1-D4, the Both Treatments scenario is the base comparison variable to
which the other treatment scenarios were compared. Odds ratios are reported with
(standard errors). Significance levels: t: p < 0.10; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.

